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Executive Summary  
There have been various calls for some form of security orientated education and/or training for life 
scientists in fora such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and there is growing interest in 
nurturing a culture of responsibility amongst life scientists. This report on biosecurity education was 
prepared to assist consideration of these issues at the December meeting of States Parties to the BTWC. 
The report begins by explaining the importance of biosecurity education, particularly for undergraduate 
life science students. It then proceeds to present the methodology and sampling techniques used in a 
survey on the extent of biosecurity education in life science degree courses in Europe and the attitudes of 
life science educators to biosecurity. Using a sample of 142 courses from 57 Universities in 29 countries 
speaking 25 different languages, we looked for evidence of biosecurity modules, bioethics modules and 
biosafety modules but also references to biosecurity, the BTWC, BW and/or arms control, dual use and 
codes of conduct (see figure 1).    
 
This research suggested that only 3 out of 57 universities identified currently offered some form of 
specific biosecurity module and in all cases this was optional for students. There is evidence of a 
considerable number of bioethics modules and nearly half of the degree programmes surveyed 
evidenced some form of bioethical focussed module. In terms of biosafety modules, the investigation 
suggests that 27 of the 142 degree courses in Europe, roughly one fifth of life science degrees in the 
sample, contain a specific dedicated biosafety module although several of these specific modules were 
optional. Exactly what constitutes a reference varies; however, based on the quantitative data from the 
investigation, we found a total of 37 life science degree courses out of our sample of 142 where there was 
clear evidence of a reference to biosecurity. Only a minority of the degree courses in the study – a total of 
22 out of 142 - made a reference to the BTWC, BW and/or arms control and a similar number, 29 degree 
courses, exhibited some reference to the dual-use issue whereas 31 life science degrees exhibited some 
form of reference to a code of conduct.  
 
Fig1. Biosecurity Related Education in a Sample of Life Science Degree Courses in Europe  
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These results were presented at a Workshop and Round Table held in Como, on October 27th, 2008 in 
which biosecurity education was discussed with international biosecurity experts and life science 
lecturers. Many participants agreed that undergraduate level would be the best option in order to reach 
the widest number of students most effectively and that the educational content should include material 
on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and national measures; the history of biological 
warfare and the role of scientists in past programmes; and the dual-use dilemma. It was further 
suggested that there is great merit to including “traditional” approaches to education, such as lectures, 
but other approaches may be a useful complement. Significantly, many felt that teaching on these issues 
should be a mandatory part of the curriculum in order to be most effective, however, it was recognised 
there may be difficulties in fitting biosecurity content into already busy teaching schedules. It was 
further recognised by participants that there is a lack of availability and suitability of biosecurity 
teaching materials for biosecurity education. To this end, the conclusions from the research process 
suggest that educational material is urgently needed and, on this basis, the next steps of the Landau-
Bradford project will focus on the production of draft materials, and on testing their implementation. 
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 1. Introduction 
As the life sciences continue to advance in a changing geostrategic context, increasing attention from a 
broad range or actors has been allotted to the concept of biosecurity, one aspect of which is educating life 
scientists on the potentially malicious ramification of their research. In the longer term, as biotechnology 
continues to advance education will become increasingly important as it engenders the possibility of 
creating a sustainable culture of responsibility which can help reduce the risk of the life sciences being 
misused for malicious purposes.  
 
This report is based on the results of a joint research project between the Landau Network-Centro Volta 
(LNCV) and the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre (BDRC). In the next section, the paper frames 
the issue of biosecurity related education looking at the proposals for greater education and outlining 
why university life science students represent a useful target group for building a culture of awareness. 
The third section outlines the aims, methodology and sampling techniques used in an investigation of 
the biosecurity content of European life science education. In the fourth section, the quantitative and 
qualitative results of this investigation are presented, thus providing an illustrative insight into the 
extent of biosecurity related education but also an appreciation of the attitudes to such education. In the 
fifth section the themes and trends that emerged from a Workshop held in Como, Italy on the 27th of 
October, 2008 are discussed. This section provides an understanding of the questions that need to be 
considered in relation to the development, adoption and promulgation of biosecurity related education 
and the perspectives of participants on the way forward. The sixth section outlines the next steps of the 
Landau-Bradford project, including the collection and drafting of educational materials and lectures, but 
also tests in participating universities. 
2. Framing the issue 
The life sciences have contributed significantly to improving the human condition, and as the 
biotechnology revolution continues to unravel the fundamental life processes, it will increasingly 
provide human kind with the capability to control the building blocks of life. In this context, just as the 
information and communication technology revolution profoundly influenced the twentieth century, it 
appears that the advance of biotechnology and the life sciences will have an equally significant impact 
on the twenty-first century.  
 
Yet this positive potential is ominously equalled by the potential for the misuse of the life sciences and 
by their capacity to cause unprecedented levels of destruction to human, animal and plant systems on a 
global scale. Various means and mechanisms have been employed at various levels - from the 
international to the individual - to prevent the misuse of science and these collectively form what has 
been termed a “web of prevention”.1 However, one theme which has received significant attention in the 
twenty first century is that of biosecurity.   
 
Biosecurity is an essentially contested concept and competing definitions have been advanced.2 Whilst 
recognising these conceptualisations, for the purpose of this investigation, biosecurity is understood as a 
collection of strategies and mechanisms intended to prevent the deliberate or inadvertent misuse of the 
                                                 
1 See for example the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross ICRC (2004) “Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity: 
introduction” available from: http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5vdj7s?opendocument; Rappert. B & McLeish. C (2007)  “A 
Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life Sciences and the Governance of Research”, Earthscan Publications Ltd; and several articles by 
Graham Pearson, including Pearson. G. S (1998) “The Vital Importance of the Web of Deterrence”, Proceedings of the Sixth International 
Symposium on Protection Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Stockholm, 11 - 15 May 1998, available at: 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/other/webdet.htm  
2 In the 2003 BTWC meetings, Australia remarked that biosecurity “within Australian agriculture… also means protecting the country from 
exotic pests and diseases through quarantine, surveillance and early detection measures” adding “the FAO use it in terms of securing food 
supplies”; Australia (2003) “Intervention by Australia” BWC/MSP/2003/4 (Vol. II) Annex II, Page 125. There is also an underlying political-
developmental issue, outside of the BTWC context, Indonesia has adopted a “broader approach” to biosecurity, suggesting it “encompasses 
biosafety import controls, and outbreak response training… Biosecurity is not limited to protecting laboratory-based pathogens and toxins from 
theft…. such a narrow strategy has limited value in Indonesia, where dangerous pathogens are not only located in laboratories, but can also be 
found readily in nature.” See also Fidler. D & Gostin. L (2007) “Biosecurity in the Global Age Biological Weapons, Public Health, and the Rule of 
Law”, Stanford University Press.  
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biological sciences for malicious purposes, specifically bioterrorism or biological warfare. In this regard, 
enhancing biosecurity requires a concerted multifaceted effort from a broad range of actors in different 
communities, one significant aspect of which is educating the life science community on their role and 
responsibility in preventing the malicious use of the life sciences.  
 
Education is not a silver bullet for dealing with the range of potential problems posed by dual use 
expertise, materials and technologies; however, it remains an important element of any biosecurity 
strategy, something evident in the increased attention being given to some form of biosecurity related 
education in several forums, including, inter alia, the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC). Indeed, the Second, Third and Fourth BTWC Review Conferences have urged “the 
inclusion in medical, scientific and military educational materials and programmes of information on the 
Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol.”3 More recently, at the 2005 BTWC meetings on Codes of 
Conduct, many State Parties underlined the need to raise the awareness of life scientists over the dual-
use concerns of the security community.4 There was sufficient support on this issue at the BTWC Sixth 
Review Conference in 2006 for a consensus statement to be added in the Article IV Additional 
Understanding, in which States Parties agreed: 
 
“…to promote the development of training and education programmes for those granted access to 
biological agents and toxins relevant to the Convention and for those with the knowledge or capacity to 
modify such agents and toxins, in order to raise awareness of the risks, as well as of the obligations of 
States Parties under the Convention.”5 
 
At the Sixth Review Conference, it was further agreed that, as part of the mandate for the Second 
Intersessional Process, States Parties would meet in 2008 to discuss, and promote common 
understanding and effective action on: 
 
“Oversight, education, awareness raising, and adoption and/or development of codes of conduct with the 
aim of preventing misuse in the context of advances in bio-science and bio-technology research with the 
potential of use for purposes prohibited by the Convention.” 6 
 
The importance of education and training has been stressed by many other actors. The Organization for 
the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)7 called for “Staff training and developing a 
biosecurity-conscious culture” arguing that the “…creation of a biosecurity-conscious culture in the community 
are important elements in establishing biosecurity”. The World Health Organization (WHO) has stated that: 
 
“...training should help understand the need for protection of …[Valuable Biological Materials]… and 
equipment and the rationale for the laboratory biosecurity adopted, and should include a review of relevant 
national policies and institution-specific procedures ... Should also provide guidance on the 
implementation of codes of conduct ... [This] training should be offered regularly...”8 
 
In terms of specific biosecurity related education at the academic level, the European Commission’s 
Green Paper on Biopreparedness of 2007 stated: 
 
                                                 
3 Language used  varies slightly. See UN (2006) “Additional Understandings And Agreements Reached By Review Conferences Relating To 
Each Article Of The Biological Weapons Convention” 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/66E5525B50871CAEC1257188003BDDD6/$file/BWC_Text_Additional_Understandin
gs.pdf 
4 See Statements of, inter alia, the UK (2006), Italy (2006) and the Netherlands (2006) “Background Information Document On Compliance By 
States Parties With Their Obligations Under The Convention” BWC/CONF.VI/INF.6, 20 November 2006. http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/6291119.html 
5 UN (2006) “BTWC Sixth Review Conference Final Document”, Geneva, BWC/CONF.VI/6 
http://www.bwpp.org/6RevCon/documents/2006126thRevConfinal.pdf Page 11 
6 Ibid Page 21 
7 OECD (2007) “Best Practice Guidelines on Biosecurity for BRCS” http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/13/38777417.pdf Page 13 
8 World Health Organization (2006)  “Biorisk Management: laboratory biosecurity guidance.” 
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_EPR_2006_6.pdf  
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“… the goal is to build up a strong culture of awareness and compliance with bio-standards already for 
first- and second-year life sciences and biotechnology students at university level. Compulsory academic 
courses in life sciences could focus on dual-use consequences of bioresearch. The courses could cover issues 
such as the risk of misuse of research results in relation to biological terrorism and warfare and 
professional responsibility as well as liability”9 
 
In 2008, the CBRN Task Force of the European Commission recommended the identification, 
development, 
 
“…and spread good practices on academic training on bio-safety standards and ethics for undergraduate, 
graduate and postgraduate students; in conjunction with university and professional associations, 
consider development of minimal requirements for academic training on bio-safety standards and ethics for 
undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate students”.10 
 
The implementation of such a recommendation, which focuses on education for undergraduate, graduate 
and postgraduate students, would provide several benefits. Firstly, the development of biological weapons 
is likely to require some degree of scientific capability, particularly with high-end agents such as anthrax 
and smallpox, and/or more advanced delivery technologies such aerosolisation or transdermal delivery. 
The development of such weapons is more likely to involve a degree of sophistication, and as a 
minimum, this would lead to a primary grouping of individuals trained in the life sciences to at least 
undergraduate level. This has further advantages in that it is the numerically largest group engaged in 
specialist study of life sciences. Secondly, a set of minimum requirements within the academic curricula 
would ensure all life sciences students graduate with at least a basic knowledge of the biosecurity 
concerns of the security community. Thirdly, it may be easier to instil concepts such as biosecurity and 
scientific responsibility during a formative academic period, which, notably, already in many cases 
includes some bioethics related provisions. Cumulatively this could facilitate the creation of a culture of 
responsibility among the next generation of life scientists that would be self-sustainable and self-
promulgating. In this regard, the CBRN Task Force of the European Commission proposal to identify, 
develop and spread good practices amongst students in university life science education may prove a 
more effective approach than workplace training and a logical first step in building a culture of 
responsibility.  
 
Thus, there have been many calls for greater awareness raising and education on the issue of dual-use 
research and biosecurity, not just in the diplomatic sphere but more broadly from inside the scientific 
community11 and amongst NGOs, several12 of which have taken the issue one step further and began the 
process of developing biosecurity or dual-use educational modules.13 Yet, despite such broad support 
and the activities being carried out amongst the NGO community, it is not clearly established the extent 
to which these statements have been translated into concrete action at the level of the practising scientist. 
 
The objective of the joint project between the Landau Network-Centro Volta (LNCV) and the Bradford 
Disarmament Research Centre (BDRC) is threefold. Firstly, it aimed to investigate the extent to which 
biosecurity education is included in academic curricula in European life sciences higher education and 
the means and methods through which this is achieved, but also develop an understanding of the 
attitudes of life scientists and life science educators towards such education. Secondly, engage the 
academic scientific community in a discussion on contents, delivery and challenges posed by the 
                                                 
9 Commission of the European Communities (2007) “Green Paper on Bio-preparedness” (5.3: Enhancing Analysis and Security Issues Related to 
Biological Research) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2007/com2007_0399en01.pdf  
10 EC CBRN Task Force BioSubGroup (2008) “Threats to Human Discussion Paper” 
http://www.ebsaweb.eu/ebsa_media/Downloads/EBSAActivities/Biosecurity+and+Bio_preparedness-p-877/Threats+to+humans-p-
881/08_08_28_Bio_Humans_prevention.doc   Page 5 
11 Editorial (2006) “Dual-use' biotech - proceed with caution”, ‘The New Scientist’, issue 2573, 14 October 2006. Internet resource, available from:   
http://www.newscientist.com/channel/opinion/mg19225732.800-editorial-dualuse-biotech--proceed-with-caution.html;  Dando, Pearson, 
Rozsa, Robinson and Wheelis (2006) “Analysis and Implications”, ‘Deadly Cultures’, London, Harvard University Press. Pg 373. 
12 See for example those NGO activities listed in  text by Brian Rappert, Marie Chevrier and Malcolm Dando (2006) “In-Depth Implementation 
of the Btwc: Education and Outreach” http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/RCP_18.pdf  
 
 
13 See section “Further sources of information” in this paper.   
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implementation of education on biosecurity. Thirdly, design pilot educational materials and test such 
material in the lecture theatre, in the process broadening and deepening a network comprising of both 
the security and the academic communities.  
3. LNCV-BDRC Investigation Background 
The aims of the LNCV-BDRC investigation were to assess the extent to which biosecurity education is 
included in academic curricula in European life sciences higher education and the means and methods 
through which this is achieved, and to provide information on the attitudes of life science educators 
towards such education. The investigation was not exclusively focused on statistic data; however it 
provides an illustrative picture of biosecurity education and attitudes in Europe. The case of Europe was 
selected not only for the geographical and social proximity with the two organizers but because 
although different university systems coexist, there has, to some extent, been a harmonization and 
integration process in academia across the region and interaction between the academic communities of 
different countries is extensive. Furthermore, there have been institutional proposals for the introduction 
of mandatory biosecurity education within the academic curricula of life science courses in the region. In 
order to achieve the objectives outlined above, the investigation was initially orientated towards 
answering the following key questions within the European context:  
 
1. Are there any biosecurity modules within the sample life science degree courses taught at 
the Universities identified? If so, what material is provided, if not, why not?  
2. Are there any bioethics modules within the sample life science degree courses taught at the 
Universities identified? Is there any Biosecurity and/or dual-use content within the bioethics 
modules? If so, what material is provided, if not, why not? 
3. Are there any biosafety modules within life science degree courses taught at the Universities 
identified? Is there any Biosecurity and/or dual-use content within the biosafety modules? If 
so, what material is provided, if not, why not? 
 
The research also aimed to answer the following more specific questions within the context of European 
higher education:  
 
4. Within the sample life science degree courses in the Universities identified, are there any 
references to concerns over “dual-use”? E.g. are students made aware of, for instance, the 
concerns that arose from the Mousepox IL-4 synthesis or Spanish flu experiments? If so, what 
material is provided, if not, why not? 
5. Within the sample life science degree courses in the Universities identified, are there any 
references to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), other relevant Arms 
Control/Disarmament Agreements and/or biological weapons? E.g. are students made 
aware of the existence of the BTWC or key aspects of the history of biological weapons? If so, 
what material is provided, if not, why not? 
6. Within the sample life science degree courses in the Universities identified, are there any 
references to Codes of conduct/ethics/practice? E.g. are students made aware of the Inter 
Academy Panel’s “statement of principles” for instance? If so, what material is provided, if 
not, why not? 
 
The focus on these six different concepts – biosecurity, dual-use, bioethics, biosafety, arms control and 
codes – was considered important because of the mutually reinforcing nature of these components in 
forming part of what has been termed a “web of prevention”. Clearly, there are other elements that 
could be included in the search term selection, for example, an explicit search for any export control 
related content within life science degree courses may prove useful. However, with limited time and a 
more specific focus on biosecurity - including “transfer security” - we settled on these six focus points 
which are discussed below.   
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3.1 Biosecurity 
The inclusion of biosecurity content within life science degree courses is an important means of ensuring 
that life scientists are cognisant of the concerns of the security community. In turn, this can facilitate 
more effective biosecurity strategies, including the physical security of pathogens, and mitigating any 
possible resistance from life scientists. Indeed, Sandia National Laboratories have suggested that “[o]ne 
of the most significant obstacles [to achieving biosecurity] is overcoming the impression – generally held 
by bioscience researchers who are not accustomed to security procedures – that biosecurity is intrusive, 
counterproductive, restrictive, or insulting”.14 
 
3.2 Bioethics 
Bioethics covers a broad range of issues. The Journal of the International Association of Bioethics, for 
example, has articles ranging from the “Ethics of Cesarean Section on Maternal Request”15 to “Is Global 
Ethics Moral Neo-Colonialism?”16 Consequently, the relationship between traditional bioethics and 
contemporary issues such as biosecurity and dual-use is often tenuous. Although bioethics remains a 
generic concept, there is evidence in the existing literature to suggest that bioethics, or some variant of 
the term, is a common component of life science courses. For example, in the UK, according to Willmott, 
a reported 69% of undergraduate programmes “include an ethical component”17, although Willmott 
further advises that this figure may not be appropriate to ‘extrapolate nationally’. Nonetheless, an 
understanding of the relationship between biosecurity and bioethics as well as a statistical data on the 
existence of such ethics modules provide a useful framework within which biosecurity concerns, 
specifically those concerning the dual-use problem, can be integrated into academia across Europe.  
 
3.3 Biosafety 
In contrast to biosecurity, the concept of biosafety is relatively well established and for “several decades, 
the WHO has been encouraging countries to implement basic concepts in biosafety”.18 In this context, an 
understanding of the extent of biosafety modules and their perceived relationship with biosecurity and 
bioethics within the context of European academia may prove useful in devising means to promulgate 
biosecurity related education.  
 
3.4 Dual-use 
The concept of dual-use describes the possibility that any technology may be put to a purpose other than 
that which it was originally intended for.19 In the BW context, this commonly refers to technologies – as 
well as agents and expertise - that can be exploited for both benign (peaceful) and malign (aggressive) 
purposes. Eminent examples of the problem of dual-use include the so-called Jackson et al’s ‘Mousepox 
IL-4’,20 Wein et al’s ‘Botulinum in milk’,21 the reconstruction of 1918 Spanish Flu22 and various examples 
of research conducted as part of biodefence programmes. An appreciation of dual-use concerns and an 
understanding of the ramifications of dual-use experiments, have the potential to contribute to both 
                                                 
14 Salerno. R (2004) “International Biosecurity Symposium: Securing High Consequence Pathogens and Toxins” Symposium Summary, SANDIA 
REPORT SAND2004-2109. http://www.biosecurity.sandia.gov/subpages/pastConf/20032005/securing/01Int-Symposium-Summary-
Final.pdf pg 16 
15 Bergeron. V (2007) “The Ethics of Cesarean Section on Maternal Request: A Feminist Critique of the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists' Position on Patient-Choice Surgery”, Bioethics Oct 9 2007 (p 478-487). 
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/biot/2007/00000021/00000009/art00003  
16 Widdows. H (2007) “Is Global Ethics Moral Neo-Colonialism? An Investigation of the Issue in the Context of Bioethics” Bioethics, Volume 21 
Issue 6 , Pages 305 - 353 (July 2007) (p 305-315). http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118486408/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0  
17 Willmott. C. J. R (2004) “Teaching Ethics to Bioscience Students – A survey of Undergraduate Provision”, ‘Bioscience Education Electronic 
journal’ Volume 3 May 2004. Internet resource, available from: http://www.bioscience.heacademy.ac.uk/journal/vol3/Beej-3-9.pdf  
18 Atlas. R (2005) “Ensuring Biosecuity and Biosafety through Bopolicy Mechanism”, Asian Biotechnology and Development Review, VOl.8 No. 1 pg 
127 
19 For more on this see for example  McLeish. C (2007) “Reflecting on the Problem of Dual Use” In:  Rappert. B & McLeish. C (2007)  “A Web of 
Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life Sciences and the Governance of Research”, Earthscan Publications Ltd.  
20 For more details on this experiments see: Mackenzie. D (2003) “US develops lethal new viruses”, ‘The New Scientists’ 29 October 2003. Internet 
resource, available from: http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn4318  
21 Mackenzie. D (2005) “Milk supplies at risk from terrorist toxin”, ‘The New Scientists’ 29 June 2005. Internet resource, available from: 
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7601  
22 Nature (2005) “Special Report The 1918 flu virus is resurrected”, Nature 437, 794-795 (6 October 2005) Published online 5 October 2005 
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v437/n7060/full/437794a.html  
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developing life scientists’ understanding of how their research could be misused but also engendering 
further informed discussion on drawing the line between legitimate and prohibited life science research.  
 
3.5 Arms Control and Partial Disarmament and Biological Weapons  
Arms control and partial disarmament agreements - particularly the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (which also covers toxins) and the 1925 
Geneva Protocol - formalise multicultural norms prohibiting the development, stockpiling, acquisition, 
obtaining and use23 of biological and chemical weapons. The BTWC and the CWC are legally binding 
upon all countries considered in this research. An in-depth understanding of these conventions and the 
history of biological and chemical warfare is too much to expect in most life science degree courses. 
Nonetheless, an awareness of the existence of these multilateral conventions and their key principles, as 
well as of key aspects of biological weapons used in biological warfare and bioterrorism, and an 
overview of key episodes is important, primarily as a means of teaching students about longstanding 
multicultural prohibitions on methods of warfare, but also to raise awareness of student’s 
responsibilities under international and national law.  
 
3.6 Code of Conduct 
The term ‘code of conduct’ was conflated with a range of ethical, legal and regulatory documents over 
the course of the first BTWC intersessional process (2002-2006). Such documents are better understood 
through the categories of codes of ethics, codes of conduct and codes of practice.24 These different codes 
serve different purposes and logically, one can assume, produce different effects. Whilst there is great 
merit to enforceable legally-binding codes, ethical codes should not readily be dismissed, and historical 
examples of short ethical codes implemented in spoken form, such as the Hippocratic Oath, have a long 
history in other professions. In 2005, the BTWC States Parties met twice in Expert and State Parties 
Meetings in Geneva to “discuss and promote common understanding and effective action on… The 
content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists”.25 The outcome of these meetings 
embodied in the substantive paragraphs of the Chair’s report on the Meeting of States Parties 2005 
makes several points, agreed by consensus. Thus, States “agreed on the value of… demonstrating the 
benefits of codes and encouraging relevant actors to develop codes themselves” and “recognis[ed] that 
codes of conduct will be most effective if they, and the principles underlying them, are widely known 
and understood”. There have subsequently been several calls for the development of a “code” including 
several examples from European States.26 In this context, an assessment of the extent to which this has 
trickled down to the university level may prove useful.  
 
3.7 Sample Selection 
The degree course sample used in this research consisted of 142 life science degree courses in Europe; 
this is based on a general selection criterion of two undergraduate courses and two master courses from 
57 universities across Europe. In selecting the life science degree courses used in this sample, several 
issues were taken into consideration, including course level, course focus and university selection.  
 
                                                 
23 Whilst the CWC and the Geneva Protocol explicitly prohibit the use of such weapons, the BTWC has no explicit prohibition on use. However, 
the BTWC is widely considered by most –not all- states to cover use and any effort to use biological weapons would entail a breach of the 
prohibition of the conventions central tenets.  
24 The former, codes of ethics, are best conceptualised as pithy aspirational codes; ‘codes of conduct’ can be defined as extended guidance 
documents; whereas codes of practice should be viewed as legal documents which prescribe the legal responsibilities of the practitioner 
25 UN (2002) “Final Document”, ‘Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their Destruction’  Geneva, 19 November – 7 December 2001 and 11 – 22 
November 2002. Internet resource, available from: http://www.opbw.org/rev_cons/5rc/docs/final_dec/BWC-CONF.V-17-(final_doc).pdf  
26 The Hungarian academy of sciences (HAS) has “initiated consultations” on this issue Hungary  (2006) BWC/CONF.VI/INF.6 Page 29; as 
early as 2002, The Estonian Academy of Sciences adopted a “Code of Ethics of Estonian Scientists” Estonia (2006) BWC/CONF.VI/INF.6 Page 
16; In the Netherlands, “As a result of the MSP in 2005, the Royal Academy for Arts and Sciences (KNAW)… will assess the potential 
contribution of codes of conduct, the content thereof and the promulgation and adoption thereof” The Netherlands (2006) 
BWC/CONF.VI/INF.6 Page 42 ; Finally, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “hosted a successful high-level seminar on codes of 
conduct at which over 70 academic and government scientists discussed fostering a culture where scientists consider the potential for the 
misuse of their work, issues related to the implementation of codes of conduct and how to pursue them in the future” .UK (2006) “Statement to 
the 6th Review Conference”,  http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/4130622CD93A31B6C125722C004C4C78/$file/BWC-
6RC-Statement-061120-UK.pdf   
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In terms of the degree course level, as noted above we posited that the target of biosecurity education 
needs to be those with the requisite capabilities to contribute to the development of biological weapons. 
In addition to the undergraduate courses, however we further decided to investigate master level 
courses on the assumption that many students working with higher-end agents or on more specialised 
areas may require further qualifications in a highly competitive market. In terms of degree course, there 
exists a broad range of courses encompassed under the rubric of the “life sciences”, with many of the 
universities in our sample offering several different courses. Complete coverage of all the courses 
offered would have involved a study of several hundred courses and thus was beyond the scope of this 
research. Accordingly, where possible, we selected two courses: one containing a significant element of 
practical knowledge and laboratory training that could conceivably be misapplied – such as 
microbiology or molecular biology; and a second course containing an applied technological component, 
such as “biotechnology” or “industrial biology”. In practice, the application of the matrix was not always 
possible.  
 
In terms of identifying the universities, the development of the sample used in this composition required 
generating a balance between, on the one hand, the leading European institutes and, on the other hand, 
identifying a sample which was, if not representative, inclusive of all European Union member States as 
well as Norway and Switzerland. There are established ranking systems used by the EU27 to identify 
leading universities and although there are differences in methodologies and criterion for assessment 
many of the leading universities identified remain similar. We used this ranking system to  
 
Fig 2. Universities investigated per European country 
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create a large list of leading European universities. Whilst purportedly indicative of the best universities 
within the EU (in addition to three from Switzerland and one from Norway), the sample remained 
unevenly distributed with some states dominating the list. Accordingly, we selected a maximum of four 
universities from the highest ranked ones from each country to be included in the sample. Furthermore, 
in order to represent the European Union Member States as broadly as possible, universities that did not 
appear in the above rankings, but that represented European Countries not listed, were added where 
possible. In some cases, continental and national rankings were used to identify the best university or 
                                                 
27 In terms of identifying the leading universities in Europe, the EC working Document, Progress towards the Lisbon Objectives in Education 
and Training, states that: “There are currently two worldwide university rankings: the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) from 
Shanghai’s Jiao Tong University, released for the first time in 2003 … and the World University Ranking  (WUR) from the Times Higher 
Education Supplement (THES)…”Commission of the European communities (2007) “Progress towards the Lisbon objectives education and 
training Indicators and Benchmarks” Commission Staff Working Document 2007. 
http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/2010/doc/progress06/report_en.pdf pg 141 
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life science departments within the country. It is also notable that to ensure regional (geographic) 
representation both Norwegian and Swiss institutes are included on the assumption that they contribute 
to the European academic environment despite not being members of the European Union. This 
criterion produced a list of 57 universities distributed across 29 European States. These are indicated in 
figure two.  
 
3.8 Methods 
To achieve the objectives outlined above using this sampling approach, we employed two methods of 
data collection: firstly, we investigated the online course details of selected degree courses in those 
European universities included in our sample, specifically looking for material dealing with biosecurity, 
dual-use, bioethics, biosafety, arms control and codes.28 Subsequently, we followed up the online 
investigation with electronic correspondence or in some cases telephone based, semi-structured 
interviews; these were primarily designed to achieve three goals:  
 
1) Confirm/develop our online investigatory results and provide a basis for discussion;  
2) Develop and understanding of contemporary attitudes to the teaching of biosecurity and/or 
dual-use components within life science degree courses in the EU; and 
3) Elicit an understanding of the reasoning for including or excluding these topics. 
 
The targets of our correspondence were primarily degree course coordinators and professors of 
bioethics courses who were considered more likely to be aware of the biosecurity related content within 
degree courses. This process of data collection produced both quantitative and qualitative material. The 
quantitative data derived from the “yes/no” questions was analysed using the electronic statistical 
software package SPSS. The qualitative data, derived from more open ended questions seeking to elicit 
an understanding of attitudes, was analysed to determine specific trends and themes in the responses of 
participants.  
 
4. LNCV-BDRC Investigation Results  
Using the methodology outlined above we were able to access life science degree course content for a 
significant majority of the courses selected in the investigation. More detailed content was often only 
available in the source language, however, through the use of translation software, it was possible to 
look though content in some 20 languages and develop an understanding of the substance of degree 
courses, if not specific nuances. There were, however, some degree courses where access was locked or 
available only for faculty members, in which case we devised the category “Not available”. In terms of 
the level of participation in the second phase of research (the email and phone contacts), responses to the 
email questions sent out were limited, with only 47 of the estimated 300 individuals contacted 
responding to either the first or second emails sent out, or, in some cases, a follow up phone call.  
 
Several factors account for this 16% response rate, not least of which is the fact that the questions were 
primarily in English, which in many cases was not the participants' first or second language. However, 
other factors are likely to be uncertainty, particularly in regard to the specific nature and content of 
degree courses and thus a reluctance to make claims over content - something which became apparent in 
follow up phone calls - and ultimately, a limited understanding of, and/or interest in, the issue of 
biosecurity education. The latter point was neatly summarised by one respondent who stated “this is not 
my ‘cup of tea’”.  
 
In this context, there are clear limitations to the material collected. Nonetheless, based on the qualitative 
and quantitative material collected in both phases of the study, it is possible to posit several findings. In 
terms of quantitative results, these are categorised under the headings “Yes”, “No”, “Unclear” and “Not 
available”. These categories are outlined in figure 3.  
 
                                                 
28 The online materials investigated referred to the academic year 2007-2008, or to the provisional programs for the academic year 2008-2009 
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Fig 3. Categories of qualitative results 
 
Term  Description 
Yes  Refers to data where we can say with a degree of certainty that X is present.  
No Refers to data where we can say with a degree of certainty that X is NOT 
present.  
Unclear Refers to data where there is some information available but we cannot say with 
certainty whether X exists or not.  
Not available  Refers to data where there are significant constraints upon access to information. 
  
Principle amongst such findings is the limited number of biosecurity modules across Europe, with only 
three universities offering a specific module and in all cases this was an optional or elective course for 
students. There are several references to issues of biosecurity, the BTWC and dual-use. However, these 
are often treated as a minimal part of a general course. In contrast, many universities highlight the 
importance of ethical content and social responsibility in the overview of their degree courses, but it is 
not always clear how these issues are delivered to the students. It is important to note that, whilst only 
representative of a small fraction of the sample, there actually exist some exemplary cases of universities, 
or singular professors, which are particularly aware and engaged in issues of biosecurity, biological 
weapons, biological warfare and dual-use and deal with these topics in some depth. A more detailed 
overview of the results is below.  
 
4.1 Biosecurity  
The research suggests that only three universities in 
our sample - Jagiellonian University (Poland), Uppsala 
University (Sweden) and University of Vienna 
(Austria) - currently offered some form of specific 
biosecurity module. In the case of Poland, module 
“BT259 infectious diseases, biological weapons and 
bioterrorism” is a 30-hour course dealing with the 
history of bioterrorism, key agents that have been used 
in incidents of bioterrorism and “current threats and 
methods against them”. This course is, however, one of 
more than 150 modules offered in biotechnology and 
biology undergraduate courses in Jagiellonian 
University.29 In the case of Uppsala, correspondence 
suggested that there were three to five modules “depending on what topic the students focus on” 
concerning biosecurity. However, such modules were short “usually 2-4 hours per course”. Based on 
broader correspondence, it became clear that at the University of Vienna, a biosecurity module has been 
developed by one individual who outlined his personal experience in weapons inspection and 
subsequently discussed, inter alia, the “the role researchers played in … [the Iraqi] … programme” and 
arms control measures such as the BTWC. Thus, from our sample of 142 life science courses, only seven 
life science degrees currently offer such a specific module in the three universities and all these modules 
appear to be optional. 
 
Qualitative results suggest that one of the reasons for the limited number of biosecurity modules is the 
constraints placed upon teaching in terms of time. Thus one respondent suggested “the main reason [for 
not having a specific biosecurity module] being the limited time we have to expose our students to 
science & society issues”. Similar sentiments were expressed by several other respondents and this 
suggests that consideration needs to be given with regard to the length of time any biosecurity module 
would take and how such a course can be practically implemented in a competitive degree course 
market, particularly if the objective is to make such a module compulsory for life scientists. It was 
                                                 
29 See material available from http://biotka.mol.uj.edu.pl/new_www/pdf/kurs-in.pdf pg 87 
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further suggested that careful consideration would need to be given to the construction and 
implementation of any such course:  
 
“A special course of biosecurity would be useful to be implemented as a joint course at the University to 
cover the very broad areas of technology covered by this university.  Such a course could also be very 
important for Ph.D.-students. However, the strategy of delivery of information in such a course should be 
well planned. Some students clearly become very worried and frightened and, on the other hand, there is 
always a risk (even if only theoretical) of misuse of the information.” 
 
There was more success in terms of biosecurity 
“references” and, based on our definition from an 
arms control perspective, we found a total of 37 life 
science degree courses out of our sample of 142 
where there was clear evidence of a reference to 
biosecurity. Nevertheless, correspondence with 
participants and further research suggests that 33 of 
the total 142 degree courses in the sample did not 
appear to make a reference to biosecurity. Moreover, 
because “references” can be both verbal and written 
and detailed course structures are often unavailable, 
a significant percentage of degree course content was 
indeterminable with any degree of certainty and thus 
unclear or in some cases not available.  
 
In cases where the evidence pointed towards a reference to biosecurity, the location of such a reference 
varied. In one case, a biosecurity reference was located in a specific module such as “guerre, paix et 
développement” (War, Peace and Development). In another case, biosecurity “issues are discussed and 
presented in the basic Microbiology course”, and in yet other cases, biosecurity was discussed in 
modules dealing with recombinant DNA technology. Largely, however biosecurity references were 
located within some form of bioethics module.   
 
Moreover, exactly what constituted a “reference” varied considerably. Thus, in some cases a reference 
constituted biosecurity being “mentioned in some courses – typically during a lecture”, “we touch upon 
biosecurity” or “Yes but very basic”. Other commentators appeared somewhat guarded in response to 
questions over biosecurity. Thus one correspondent suggested that: 
 
“There isn't any specific reference to biosecurity as defined in your letter. There are references to what we 
understand are positive uses of bioresearch. Some of the courses include discussions about applications and 
implications of biological research and biotechnology in society, and these courses highlight the positive 
contributions that new technologies offer in a broad range of fields, from medicine to environmental science 
to forensics.” 
 
Whereas a participant from one of the leading universities in Europe stated that: 
 
 “There is no research going on within the Department related to biosecurity or with a potential 
biosecurity risk. Thus, the focus is on biohazards and the general ethics of research. If there was reason 
within the aims of the course to refer to research with biosecurity implications, then we would feel obliged 
to also present those implications and discuss the issues around them.” 
 
There were some grounds for optimism regarding biosecurity. One participant suggested that 
“Biosecurity issues are discussed and presented in the basic Microbiology course, where 2 lectures 
specifically address a) microbial hazards with reference to biosecurity b) international treatises on 
biosecurity and their implementation.” Another participant stated there was a biosecurity reference, 
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adding that “The Royal Academy of Sciences (KNAW) in the Netherlands has a project on Biosecurity 
and dual use”. Yet another correspondent suggested that:  
 
“biosecurity takes about three units (each 45 minutes) it might be too long, but I recognized that students 
find it quite interesting to hear about real stories that I had been involved and shows them that it is in no 
way a theoretical and abstract subject. So as an entry to the subject I spend about 45 minutes talking about 
my personal experiences in Iraq where I had spent a few years of my life looking for biological weapons, it 
starts with a historic background and than focuses on the role researchers played in this programme, it also 
gives me an opportunity at the end of this 45 minutes to shift over to other types (than UNSCRs) of legal 
instruments related to BW (Conventions, Australia Group, National and EU legislation, ethics 
guidelines).” 
 
This latter example is extraordinary and such detailed coverage appears the exception rather than the 
norm.  
 
4.2 Bioethics Module  
In contrast with biosecurity modules, there is 
evidence of a considerable number of bioethics 
modules within life science courses across Europe 
and nearly half of the degree programmes surveyed 
evidenced some form of bioethical focussed module. 
Several participants suggesting bioethics was 
embedded within the curriculum at both levels. 
 
Such modules cover a wide range of issues and are 
taught by lecturers from a range of backgrounds 
(law, life sciences, philosophy or ethics). In some 
cases, the respondents suggested that they try to 
teach students a ‘method’ for bioethical decision-
making, thus trying to instil students with a broader 
view without going into detail on the multiple ethical issues they may have to face. Beyond this generic 
‘method’ or  framework approach, based on the research conducted, the following examples are 
indicative of the breadth of topics covered in such ethical modules: freedom, responsibility, concepts of 
moral action; “good and evil”; “Questions of Religious Sciences”; “the use and collection of DNA/RNA 
data”; “the role of science in society”; “ethical and political aspects of biological research”; “Intellectual 
property”; “Developmental issues”; “theories about the unintended social effects of biomedical 
technology”; “stem cell research”; and “Ethics of Animal/Patient Research”. This broad range of issues 
under the umbrella of bioethics suggests that new issues will have to compete for inclusion in bioethics 
courses.  
 
Fig 7. Bioethics Modules by level 
 
Bioethics Module  
 Masters Undergrad Total 
No 33 28 61 
Yes 28 40 68 
Unclear 5 3 8 
Not available 3 2 5 
Total 69 73 142 
 
In terms of distribution between undergraduate and postgraduate level, 40 out of 73 undergraduate 
degrees had some form of bioethics module which was in many cases compulsory, whereas 28 out of 69 
postgraduate degrees exhibited some form of bioethics module. This issue of timing is significant in 
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terms of developing some form of biosecurity reference, for example, first years may not be able to fully 
understand such consideration because of the absence of scientific skills at this early stage.  
 
Although the breadth of issues covered under the umbrella of bioethics remains large, the fact that the 
subject is prevalent in life science courses suggests that through a modest extension of such modules, 
biosecurity concerns could be inserted either as a sub-module or as a short series of lectures within a 
bioethics module. In order to achieve this, however, there needs to be both an incentive to include these 
issues in the curriculum and adequate provision of materials available to ensure informed teaching of 
this topic.  
 
4.3 Biosafety Module 
In terms of biosafety modules, the investigation 
suggests that 27 of the 142 degree courses in 
Europe, roughly one fifth of life science degrees in 
the sample, contain a specific dedicated biosafety 
module and several of these specific modules were 
optional. However, this belies the fact that several 
of the participants posited that basic laboratory 
training was embedded within other modules.  
 
Such courses are evenly distributed between 
undergraduate and post graduate levels. Various 
elements fall under the content of such modules, 
examples include “Science of Risk and Safety in 
Chemistry and Biotechnology”; “Understanding of 
the safety regulations in a bioscience laboratory”; “emergency procedures, environmental, fire safety 
etc”; “basic aspects of contamination, infection and prevention”;30 and “the safety requirements for 
working in chemical and biological laboratories”.31  
 
Fig 9. Biosafety Modules by level 
 
Biosafety Module  
 Masters Undergrad Total 
No 43 45 88 
Yes 13 14 27 
Unclear 10 12 22 
Not available 3 2 5 
Total 69 73 142 
 
Based on the initial investigation and further correspondence with participants, it remains probable that 
practical biosafety training varies across the EU both in terms of standards and coverage. Several reasons 
account for such variance. Firstly, the disparate nature of laboratory facilities means a disparate level of 
applied biosafety proficiency. Secondly, the absence of accessible laboratory space for students to 
undertake practical work suggests that in some institutes “training is rather theoretical” whereas in 
other facilities Good Laboratory Practice (GLP) standards are employed in practical training. In between 
these poles, some universities, whilst aspiring to GLP standards are likely to struggle to maintain such 
high standards when dealing with a large volume – in the hundreds in some cases - of students 
undertaking practical work.   
 
                                                 
30 See the link for more details http://www.unimaas.nl/bestand.asp?id=8706  
31 See the link for more details 
http://66.102.9.104/translate_c?hl=en&langpair=auto|en&u=http://studiegids.uva.nl/web/uva/2007_2008/nl/c/8606.html&tbb=1&usg=AL
kJrhgKRvHjLslj_dOULDkt0Iyimh3Xxg  
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4.4 BTWC / Arms Control and/or Biological 
Weapons Reference  
Based on the research conducted, it appears that 
only a minority of the courses in the study – a 
total of 22 - made a reference to the BTWC, BW 
and/or arms control, whereas a nearly a third 
reported that they did not discuss the BTWC,  
Arms Control and/or Biological Weapons. 
Furthermore, exactly what constituted a reference 
varied, in some cases “It is mentioned in some 
course(s) – typically during a lecture” or a 
reference was “embedded in the subjects.”  
 
Indeed, based on the correspondence, it can be 
suggested that teaching these issues is not 
common, and in cases where such topics are 
taught there are normally singular conditions. 
Thus one degree course in which these topics 
were discussed was linked to a foundation for peace studies; in another the course was taught by a 
former weapons inspector, whereas two other courses which made reference to these issues were a 
product of national project which covered issues such as the BTWC, as was the case in the Netherlands 
and Sweden.32 In the remaining cases, the BTWC and Arms control related issues were referred to either 
in textbooks for the course ( for example in the Introduction to Biotechnology by Thieman and Palladino33 
or in an Italian bioethics textbook34) or otherwise mentioned by the lecturer.  
 
In terms of the specific nature of teaching on these issues, several courses exhibited a bioterrorism-
focused approach. A Swedish-based respondent claimed “We do discuss bioterrorism in the first course 
and refer to the Swedish systems of control; SMI and FOI as well as some materials from American 
CDC”. Other courses discussed bioterrorism, biological weapons and international arms control 
agreements, in Poland, for example, one module deals with what has been translated as: 
 
“The essence of bioterrorism. The history of the application [of] biological weapons. The breakdown of 
biological agents, which can be used as a biological weapon… Hazards related to viral infection… 
Preservation, sustainability and the means of factors constituting biohazard. Organizations in the fight 
against terrorism, acts linked to the control and elimination of biological weapons.”35 
 
Yet other courses provided an approach more closely focused on State biological weapons programmes 
and national legislation:  
 
“... the Iraqi BW programme is briefly discussed, the BTWC is discussed in context of national legislation 
resulting from the implementation of the BTWC, the CWC is discussed briefly in the context of chemical 
safety and export-import control.” 
 
From the responses received which indicated they did not make a reference to the BTWC or biological 
weapons or arms control, the qualitative elaboration on these issues varied. Thus some respondents 
indicated reluctance to engage in such topics, as one commentator suggested, “we do not teach anything 
to do with the BTWC. I'm not sure if teaching such material on the BTWC would be helpful to our 
students unless they went into the field”. Others were more supportive of such an inclusion and indeed 
                                                 
32 Correspondent suggested that “The Royal Academy of Sciences (KNAW) in the Netherlands has a project on Biosecurity and dual 
use…[specifically on the BW question]… The KNAW has a project running and the provide us with a lot of information”. 
33 Thieman W.J and Palladino M (2008), “Introduction to Biotechnology”, Chapter 13: Ethics and Biotechnology”, Pearson Benjamin Cummings, 2008 
34 Tallacchini M. C., Terragni F. (2004), “Le biotecnologie. Aspetti etici, sociali e ambientali”, Chapter 9: Le Armi Biologiche, B. Mondadori, Campus, 
2004 
35 Approximate translation “BT259 infectious diseases, biological weapons and bioterrorism” see the following link for details in Polish.  
http://biotka.mol.uj.edu.pl/new_www/pdf/kurs-in.pdf   pg 87 
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one participant replied to our question over the existence of BTWC / Arms Control and Biological 
Weapons Reference by stating “No, but I will take profit of your enquiry and integrate these issues in the 
introductory course starting with this year”. 
 
4.5 Dual-use 
In terms of references to dual-use, 29 degree 
courses exhibited some reference to the dual-use 
issue whereas 33 courses did not appear to make 
any reference to this topic. Information for over 
half of the courses was unclear or unavailable, 
thus based on degree courses where information 
is available, just under half of the courses samples 
indicated they made reference to the issue of 
dual-use.  
 
In terms of where and when such a reference was 
made the specifics varied. In some cases a 
discussion was embedded in science focused 
modules such as the “basic microbiology course” 
in other cases this was part of a bioethics module 
or some form of “ethics and technology” or “history of science” module. In terms of what level these 
references were targeted at, 17 of the 29 positive responses were within undergraduate degree 
programmes. 
 
In terms of responses to the notion of dual-use being included within life science degrees, attitudes 
varied. On the one hand several respondents were very positive about this issue stating: “Yes, it is an 
area where very limited awareness among students and faculty exists”; “Candidates should be aware of 
these subjects but I don’t think it can fill out a full course”; “At the level of specific exercises or lectures, 
probably yes.”; “I think we need to bring it up at more than what we do, since it probably is not brought 
up more than a few occasions during the five year programme, maybe suggest/offer a bioethics course 
to the student”.  
 
On the other hand, a smaller number of respondents were more critical often expressing concerns over 
the space and time for such a discussion. Thus participants suggested “Only to a certain extent, and 
depending on the required time and resources”; “This is a difficult question to answer. All knowledge is 
useful. It is a matter of priorities and of limited number of credits/programme”. Notably a few other 
responses were more forceful suggesting “not at this time” and, in one cases, “dual use? well, I don't 
know how far this is serious”. Notwithstanding these latter concerns, it becomes apparent that there is 
some interest in incorporating these issues into the curriculum; however, once again any measures 
through which this could be achieved would need to be optimised to satisfy concerns over limited space 
and time within life science degree courses.  
 
4.6 Codes of Conduct/Practice/Ethics 
In terms of references to codes of conduct, practice and/or ethics, 31 life science degrees revealed they 
made reference to some form of code whereas 30 did not. Because of the difficulties in accessing and 
accurately assessing the full scope of the course material, material dealing with 81 degree courses was 
not available or unclear.  
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In terms of the location of such references this varied considerably. In some cases these were “integrated 
into a broader framework course” or taught in specific modules such as “regulations in biotechnology”, 
“ethics and engineering”, or as “part of the laboratory work education, specifically when dealing with 
bacteria and viruses”. There was also a degree of variation in terms of what type of code was discussed, 
with some degree courses focusing on more 
formalised codes i.e. the ‘European codes of 
conduct’, the Helsinki declaration or in one 
case, the Dutch Code, regarding which one 
commentator stated:  
 
Royal Academy of Sciences (KNAW) in the 
Netherlands has a project on Biosecurity and 
dual use. The international code of conduct 
will be introduced in The Netherlands this 
year. The KNAW produces information… and 
is formulating a strategy on how to implement 
this code of conduct. However, this is a 
national project and is not a part of a 
university course yet. 
 
Other participants pointed to less formalised, 
more ethically orientated material, thus one 
participant suggested their reference to codes was “More to a personal code than to a written code”. Yet 
others focused on codes more in terms of animal experimentation, GMOs or Stems Cells. Indeed, in 
response to the question do you make reference to codes one participant posited: “Yes, mainly 
discussing the regulation of the national committee for Life Sciences which is supporting national 
policies in the field.  Unfortunately this platform is too oriented towards health/hot topics as stem cells, 
etc.” 
 
5.  LNCV Workshop and Roundtable 
The Workshop and Round Table on “Fostering the 
Biosecurity Norm: An Educational Module for Life 
Sciences Students” took place in Como, in the 
Council Room of the Town Hall of the City of 
Como, on October 27th, 2008.  The Scientific 
Organizing Committee included the IWG-LNCV 
and the BDRC, and the Landau Network-Centro 
Volta Secretariat provided the logistical 
organization. The meeting was organized thanks to 
the support of the Italian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the US Civilian Research and Development 
Foundation, the International Science and 
Technology Center, the Lombardy Region and the 
Municipality of Como. The aim of the workshop 
was to bring together experts, officials participating 
in their personal capacity, and importantly representatives of the scientific academic community -
including professors and course coordinators involved in life science academic education - to discuss the 
introduction and/or development of biosecurity considerations within the life science academic 
curricula. 
 
5.1 Round Table 
The first session was designed to frame the issue of biosecurity education and to identify positive and 
proactive means by which biosecurity related education could be developed in life sciences academic 
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curricula. After the welcome addresses of the organizers, the first speakers were the representative of the 
European Commission Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection (DG SANCO) and the 
Chairman of the 2008 BTWC Meetings. The institutional representatives underlined the importance of 
discussing the issue of biosecurity education for the next generation of life scientists and devising a 
roadmap for implementation. The Chairman of the BTWC also presented the outcomes of the Meeting of 
Experts of the BTWC held in August 2008, and the work of the Convention’s Implementation Support 
Unit (ISU). Subsequently, participants outlined the issues that need to be considered, such as: Who 
needs to be educated? What should be the contents of biosecurity related education? How can 
biosecurity related education be most effectively delivered? At what level should such education take 
place? Who should be the educator? And what challenges can be envisaged in efforts to implement 
biosecurity education?  
 
This was followed by a situational analysis of existing biosecurity related education provision around 
the world. Although some participants felt that the life science community has come a long way in 
certain regions, it was broadly recognised that there remains much more to be done and that there is 
very limited educational material on biosecurity, dual-use and biological weapons in existing life 
sciences academic curricula. It was further recognised that the advance and expansion of biotechnology 
widens the problem of dual-use, thus making the development of biosecurity related education an 
increasingly urgent aspect of biosecurity. This was followed by a productive exchange on the challenges 
of implementation of biosecurity education and possible strategies to overcome such challenges and 
move forward. 
 
5.2 Contents of Education 
One topic of discussion during the workshop was the contents of biosecurity education. In this regard, 
whilst recognising that "no one size fits all", there was some agreement amongst the participants that the 
education should include material on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and national 
regulations; the history of biological warfare and the role of scientists in past programmes; and the dual-
use dilemma. Whilst it would be too much to expect students to study the BWTC in any depth, material 
on the BTWC and national measures taken in accordance with Article IV - which deals with national 
implementation -, is clearly of importance in generating an understanding of the international and 
national prohibitions on biological weapons and how such measures form a “web of prevention”. 
However, it was further posited that it would be useful to provide material on historical incidence of 
biological weapons programmes and the role of scientists within such programmes, as this would help 
in generating an understanding of the role and responsibility of scientists. Inextricably linked to this, 
material on the dual-use dilemma would be useful in explaining the potentially malign consequences of 
some experiments, such as Mousepox IL-4 and 1918 Spanish flu reconstruction. It was further suggested 
that such discussion may prove particularly engaging and contemporary and consequently, would likely 
catch the attention of students. 
 
5.3 Curricular intervention points 
A second area of discussion was how to deliver biosecurity related education to life scientists. It was 
clear from discussion that there is great merit to including “traditional” approaches to education, such as 
lectures covering the content identified above in conjunction with an essay writing approach to 
concretise taught material and stimulate further independent thinking. However, it was also posited that 
there are several advantages to adopting a  more “interactive” approach.  Such an interactive approach 
could take several forms, for example one participant outlined the advantages to role play exercises as a 
means of both raising students’ attention and explaining the links with their practical work in both the 
present and the future.  
 
This latter approach was served as an example of ‘active learning’, an approach that engages the 
students, making them “think in somebody else’s shoes”. This may prove advantageous in promoting 
the development of writing and thinking, but may also be particularly effective in raising interest in 
issues that are new or uncomfortable for the students. There is also some precedent for this approach 
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and role playing exercises with life sciences students on dual-use have been developed and tested by 
Marie Chevrier, Malcolm Dando and Brian Rappert. Based on their experience it was suggested that 
students generally enjoyed the simulation exercise, and while it could be a problem to use role playing if 
biosecurity and dual-use education was a compulsory element of courses with a large number of 
students, the simulation technique could still be adapted through smaller breakout groups.  
 
5.4 Target level  
In terms of what level is most appropriate to target with biosecurity related educational strategies, the 
Workshop participants posited that the undergraduate level would be the best option in order to reach 
the widest number of students, and also recognising that existing bioethics courses or courses with social 
or other non scientific subjects are more common in the undergraduate degrees. However, it further 
needs to be kept in mind that students may have an insufficient understanding of science in the early 
stages of degree courses and this may limit the extent to which some material can be understood and 
applied. In this regard, it was suggested that it would be ideal to have biosecurity related material 
revisited as part of the degree process as well as in post graduate degrees. 
 
5.5 Compulsory or Optional Biosecurity Education 
Many participants pointed out that in order to have effective and far reaching biosecurity related 
education, teaching on these issues should be mandatory for all those individuals who could contribute 
either deliberately or inadvertently to the development of biological weapons. Such an approach would 
cement biosecurity related education as part of the core, compulsory curriculum and it was suggested by 
several participants that this represents the most suitable means of embedding biosecurity within the 
curricula rapidly and widely. However, it was recognised by some participants that compulsory 
biosecurity related education would be a challenge, not least, because of the increasing number of 
competing topics that need to be covered in life science education and the limited teaching time 
available within degree courses. In between these two positions, some participants felt that even if some 
of the biosecurity, dual-use and biological weapons contents were made optional, as a minimum 
baseline, the teaching of legal obligations and the prohibitions on biological and toxin weapons must be 
mandatory.  
 
5.6 Who should be the educator 
The professors, course coordinators and other participants largely agreed that the best educator for 
biosecurity would be a life scientist and this would be particularly important in explaining dual-use 
issues. However, in order for life scientists - or indeed bioethicists and specialists from other non 
security related disciplines - to teach this issue, biosecurity related teaching materials are essential and 
several participants pointed out that the extent, availability, suitability and location of such materials 
was not entirely clear. In this context, it was suggested that it would be useful to both promote and point 
interested individuals towards existing online material, such as that developed by the Federation of 
American Scientists, but also maintain some form of open source website for exchanging educational 
material. More ambitiously it was posited by one participant that it may be worthwhile establishing an 
open source clearing house which participants could share teaching materials and lesson plans, as well 
as exchanging evaluations of teaching material.   
 
6.  Next Steps 
In terms of the future direction of the joint project, Landau-Bradford proposed to build a collection of 
biosecurity educational materials which will be freely accessible to life science educators and interested 
parties. The objective would be to broaden and deepen the network established through the research 
and the workshop and share resources and experience in order to support the effective implementation 
of greater biosecurity education. In terms of the Bradford-Landau educational material, the following 
themes are being developed:  
 
• The Responsibilities of Life Scientists. 
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• The Dual-Use Dilemma in the Life Sciences- Including material on the Fink Report and the 
Lemon-Relman Report and cases of dual-use experiment, such as the Mousepox Experiment, the 
Spanish Flu reconstruction.  
• The Threat of Biological Warfare (BW) and Biological Terrorism - Including aspects end episodes 
of the history of biological weapons, biowarfare and terrorism 
• The International Prohibition Regime - Including regulations under the BTWC, CWC, Geneva 
Protocol and the WHO as well as other organizations, particularly stressing the legal obligations 
• National Implementation of the BTWC 
• Building an Effective Web of Prevention 
 
However, in order to maximise the potential of such material, sound methodological and ethical 
components are being developed as well as greater clarification of concepts such as the web of 
prevention. Such material will be made available from the project website, where, significantly, materials 
from the meeting are already available. In 2009, this material will be tested at participating universities 
and it is hoped that feedback from such tests will enable us to develop our materials and sustain interest 
in this type of education beyond the 2008 meetings.  
 
It would further be interesting to expand the investigation beyond Europe, learning from the experience 
of the first phase of the research outlined above, and broadening the network on a global level. Although 
similar research has been conducted in the US, and some of the findings from the European focused 
investigation can be extrapolated internationally. There is no one size fits all approach and accordingly, 
gaining an understanding of differences and similarities in national and regional attitudes to biosecurity 
related education may facilitate the development, promulgation and adoption of this type of education 
taking into account different cultural perspectives. 
7. Conclusions 
The changing international context has generated increased interest in biosecurity education. However, 
based on the research conducted over the course of the LNCV-BDRC investigation on biosecurity 
education in Europe, the workshop and other sources, it appears that interest has not manifest in 
significant concrete action at the level of the life science academic community. Indeed, it becomes 
apparent that very little exists in terms of biosecurity related education. Some exceptional existing cases 
could be considered as examples or models, but we are far from achieving the necessary levels of 
biosecurity related education for life sciences students to be able to generate a culture of responsibility. 
 
There are a variety of reasons, identified by participants contacted in the Landau-Bradford project, to 
account for these limitations in biosecurity related education. Some participants felt such material was 
irrelevant, others suggested such teaching may serve to unnerve students, yet others were unfamiliar 
with these issues and thus felt unqualified to teach these topics. However, one repeatedly cited 
explanation was the growing body of competing topics which life science educators are required to teach 
in competitive degree courses.  This latter point is important when considering the development 
promulgation, adoption of biosecurity education and there is a clear need for balance and 
proportionality. In this regard, it may be more logical to support the integration of biosecurity related 
education within existing course structures and the prevalence of bioethics modules may prove useful to 
this end. However, in order for this to be effective, it requires that biosecurity education be a part of the 
core, compulsory curriculum for life scientists in order to develop a self-sustaining and self-
promulgating culture of responsibility.   
 
To achieve this there is a need for the States Parties to the BTWC to make a strong statement recognising 
the value of compulsory biosecurity education, in accordance with national requirements and 
circumstances, as making a significant and effective contribution, in conjunction with other measures 
including national legislation, to combating the present and future threats posed by biological and toxin 
weapons, as well as by raising awareness of the Convention, and by helping relevant actors to fulfil their 
legal, regulatory and professional obligations and ethical principles. This could further be reinforced by 
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agreement on the value of demonstrating the benefits of compulsory biosecurity education and 
encouraging relevant actors to develop biosecurity education. Indeed, it is notable that in cases where 
states have taken a lead, there appears to be a heightened sense of awareness of the concerns of the 
security community.  
 
Whilst there is a clear role for States acting collectively and independently, it is also apparent that there 
are limits to what can be done at the diplomatic level and building a culture of awareness requires the 
life science community to more actively engage on the issue of biosecurity. This requires linking together 
the various initiatives on biosecurity education and related projects and, in this sense, the BTWC 
Implementation Support Unit could have a role collecting, collating and distributing information on 
related activities. There is also a clear role for higher educational institutions in making biosecurity 
related education a requisite for the completion of a degree course. Similarly, research funders could 
push such education further through making biosecurity related education an essential requirement for 
funding.  
 
Biosecurity related education is not a silver bullet for ensuring biosecurity, yet it is an important 
component in the ‘web of prevention’. As the life sciences continue to advance, the ability of the 
scientifically uninitiated to comprehend the ramifications of certain types of research may increasing be 
surpassed and nurturing a global sense of responsibility amongst scientists now may pay dividends in 
ensuring the benign advancement of science and society in the future.  
8. Recommendations 
Based on the research, it appears that there is still much that needs to be done in terms of biosecurity 
related education. To achieve this, we argue that what is needed is a State Party-level initiative that 
emphasises the value of ensuring biosecurity related education for life science students. In this regard, it 
would be fruitful if the States Parties to the BTWC recognise the value of compulsory biosecurity 
education, in accordance with national requirements and circumstances, as making a significant and 
effective contribution, in conjunction with other measures including national legislation, to combating 
the present and future threats posed by biological and toxin weapons, as well as by raising awareness of 
the Convention, and by helping relevant actors to fulfil their legal, regulatory and professional 
obligations and ethical principles. This could further be reinforced by agreement on the value of 
demonstrating the benefits of compulsory biosecurity education and encouraging relevant actors to 
develop biosecurity education through the creation of some form of implementation framework. 
 
In looking to the future, it is clear that momentum needs to be sustained through and beyond the BTWC 
Meeting of States Parties in 2008. There is no one size fits all approach to achieving this and biosecurity 
education must be compatible with national legislation and regulatory controls as well as differing 
cultural contexts around the world. However, this does not rule out the possibility of building blocks 
and resources being developed to support the development, adoption and promulgation of biosecurity 
education which can facilitate stakeholder development of material, thus allowing scientists a degree of 
ownership of biosecurity related education. Furthermore, it needs to be kept in mind that life scientists 
have a growing number of ethical and technical issues to cover in degree courses. Given these multiple 
issues, it may be better to consider how we can integrate new material dealing with the concerns of the 
security community into existing course structures - such as bioethics modules which appear prevalent 
at least in the European context - and make these both part of the core, compulsory curriculum for all life 
scientists. Such teaching material will need to be easily accessible and flexible in order to be widely 
integrated into existing structures and educational material needs to be coupled with a clear statement 
outlining the underlying rationale for biosecurity education.  
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Annex: Workshop Agenda  
Monday, October 27th 
  
9.15-9.30 Opening by the IWG Organizers 
Maurizio Martellini, IWG-LNCV, Como, Italy 
Malcolm Dando, University of Bradford, UK 
Jan-Peter Paul, European Commission, DG SANCO, Brussels, Belgium 
 
9.30-10.00 Education and Awareness Raising in the 2008 Meetings of the BWC  
H.E. Amb. Georgi Avramchev, Chairman of 2008 Meetings of the Biological Weapons 
Convention 
 
10.00-11.30 Session 1. Introducing and Framing the Issue of Biosecurity Education for Life Sciences 
Students. 
 Chair: Maurizio Martellini, IWG-LNCV, Como, Italy 
 
• Educating Life Science Students: Key Question Filippa Lentzos, BIOS Centre, London 
School of Economics, UK 
• Framing the Issue on Education on Biological Weapons, Biosecurity and Dual-Use Brian 
Rappert, University of Exeter, UK 
• The US National Academies and Initiatives on Biosecurity Education Jo Husbands, The 
National Academies, Washington DC, US 
• Investigation into the Biosecurity Content of European Life Science Degree Courses IWG-
LNCV and Bradford Disarmament Research Centre Project Giulio Mancini, LNCV, 
Como, Italy & James Revill, University of Bradford, UK 
 
11.45-13.15 Session 2. Projects for Education of Life Scientists: Contents of Education and How to Deliver 
Chair: H.E. Amb. Georgi Avramchev, Chairman of 2008 Meetings of the Biological Weapons 
Convention 
    
• Biosecurity Education in US Universities Jennifer StaAna, Center for Science, 
Technology, and Security Policy, American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, Washington DC, US 
• The Development of Biosafety, Biosecurity and Bioethics Educational Programs in Leading 
Universities in Russia Sergey Netesov, Vice Rector (Research), Novosibirsk State 
University, Russia 
• Preparing Scientists and Engineers for Social Responsibility Henk Zandvoort, Delft 
University of Technology, Netherlands 
 
14.30-16.00 Session 2 (continuation). Projects for Education of Life Scientists: Contents of Education and 
How to Deliver 
Chair: H.E. Amb. Georgi Avramchev, Chairman of 2008 Meetings of the Biological Weapons 
Convention 
 
• Developing the Material Required for Mandatory Dual-Use Education of Life Scientists 
Simon Whitby, University of Bradford, UK & Nariyoshi Shinomiya, National 
Defense Medical College, Tokyo, Japan 
• The Role Playing Exercise Marie Isabelle Chevrier, University of Texas, Dallas TX, 
US  
• An Educational Module for Life Scientists IWG-LNCV and Bradford Disarmament 
Research Centre Project Malcolm Dando, University of Bradford, UK 
 
16.15-17.30 Session 3. Roundtable Interaction 
Chair: Malcolm Dando, University of Bradford, UK 
 
17.30-18.00 Conclusions and Adjournment 
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Further sources of information 
 
• Landau Network-Centro Volta “Contributions to the Workshop and Round Table ‘Fostering the 
Biosecurity Norm: An Educational Module for Life Sciences Students’ Available at: 
http://www.centrovolta.it/landau/2008/11/10/ContributionsToTheWorkshopAndRoundTab
leFosteringTheBiosecurityNormAnEdu.aspx  
“Science and Technology for Non Proliferation Program” 
http://www.centrovolta.it/landau/StaticPage.aspx?Control=NonProliferation 
• University of Bradford “Bradford Project on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC)” http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/  
• Federation of American Scientists “Case Studies in Dual Use Research” Available at: 
http://www.fas.org/biosecurity/education/dualuse/index.html  
• Southeast Regional Center of Excellence for Emerging Infections and Biodefence “The Dual 
Use Dilemma in Biological Research” 
http://www.serceb.org/modules/serceb_cores/index.php?id=3  
• Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation “Biosecurity: Risks, Responses, and 
Responsibilities” http://politicsandthelifesciences.org/index.html  
• George Mason University “Biodefense Graduate Program” http://pia.gmu.edu/grad/biod  
• University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation "Public Policy and 
Biological Threats: Training the Next Generation" http://www-
igcc.ucsd.edu/cprograms/PPBT/PPBT.php  
• International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) “Educational material for raising 
awareness of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the multiple uses of chemicals” 
http://www.iupac.org/web/ins/2005-029-1-050  
• MIT Professional Education Programme “Pandemics and Bioterrorism: From Realistic Threats to 
Effective Policies” http://web.mit.edu/mitpep/pi/courses/combating_bioterrorism.html  
• Nuclear Threat Initiative “BW Terrorism Tutorial” 
http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/bwtutorial/index.html  
 
For specific educational material:  
• Role play exercise material 
http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/codesofconduct/Publications/Roles.doc  
• The Life Sciences, Biosecurity, and Dual Use Research Briefing and instructions 
http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/codesofconduct/BiosecuritySeminar/Education/index.htm  
 
For general material on Biological weapons and the BTWC:  
 
• United National Office Geneva http://www.unog.ch/bwc   
• CBW Conventions Bulletin http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/hsp/bulletin.html  
• University of Bradford Briefing Papers http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/  
• The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) website (OPBW) 
http://www.opbw.org/  
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There have been various calls for some form of security orientated education and/or training for life scientists in 
fora such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and there is growing interest in nurturing a culture of 
responsibility amongst life scientists. This report on biosecurity education was prepared to assist consideration of 
these issues at the December meeting of States Parties to the BTWC. The report begins by explaining the 
importance of biosecurity education, particularly for undergraduate life science students. It then proceeds to 
present the methodology and sampling techniques used in a survey on the extent of biosecurity education in life 
science degree courses in Europe and the attitudes of life science educators to biosecurity. Using a sample of 142 
courses from 57 Universities in 29 countries speaking 25 different languages, we looked for evidence of biosecurity 
modules, bioethics modules, biosafety modules but also references to biosecurity, the BTWC, BW and/or arms 
control, dual use and codes of conduct. 
 
This research suggested that only 3 out of 57 universities identified currently offered some form of specific 
biosecurity module and in all cases this was optional for students. There is evidence of a considerable number of 
bioethics modules and nearly half of the degree programmes surveyed evidenced some form of bioethical 
focussed module. In terms of biosafety modules, the investigation suggests that 27 of the 142 degree courses in 
Europe, roughly one fifth of life science degrees in the sample, contain a specific dedicated biosafety module 
although several of these specific modules were optional. Exactly what constitutes a reference varies; however, 
based on the quantitative data from the investigation, we found a total of 37 life science degree courses out of our 
sample of 142 where there was clear evidence of a reference to biosecurity. Only a minority of the degree courses 
in the study – a total of 22 out of 142 - made a reference to the BTWC, BW and/or arms control and a similar 
number, 29 degree courses, exhibited some reference to the dual-use issue whereas 31 life science degrees 
exhibited some form of reference to a code of conduct.  
 
These results were presented at a Workshop and Round Table held in Como, on October 27th, 2008 in which 
biosecurity education was discussed with international biosecurity experts and life science lecturers. Many 
participants agreed that undergraduate level would be the best option in order to reach the widest number of 
students most effectively and that the educational content should include material on the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention and national measures; the history of biological warfare and the role of scientists in past 
programmes; and the dual-use dilemma. It was further suggested that there is great merit to including 
“traditional” approaches to education, such as lectures, but other approaches may be a useful complement. 
Significantly, many felt that teaching on these issues should be a mandatory part of the curriculum in order to be 
most effective, however, it was recognised there may be difficulties in fitting biosecurity content into already busy 
teaching schedules. It was further recognised by participants that there is a lack of availability and suitability of 
biosecurity teaching materials for biosecurity education. To this end, the conclusions from the research process 
suggest that educational material is urgently needed and, on this basis, the next steps of the Landau-Bradford 
project will focus on the production of draft materials, and on testing their implementation. 
